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All usPolitical booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, pre-
dict financial crises above and beyond better known early warning in-
dicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only
holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in develop-
ing countries have stronger incentives to “ride” unsound credit booms
in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing correc-
tive policies that could prevent crises but are politically costly. We pro-
vide evidence of the relevance of this mechanism, partly by construct-
ing a new cross-country data set on government popularity based on
opinion polls.I. IntroductionA consistent predictor of financial crises, both in advanced and emerging
economies, is the magnitude of the preceding credit boom. Schularickthank Harald Uhlig and three anonymous referees for excellent and extensive feed-
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Alland Taylor (2012), for example, claim that “credit growth is a powerful
predictor of financial crises, suggesting that such crises are credit booms
gone wrong and that policy makers ignore credit at their peril.”1 This re-
sult poses a challenge to the understanding of financial crises and thus
for the design of financial regulation. If a credit boom is a warning signal,
why do policy makers not take more corrective steps to control credit ex-
pansion? Why are macroprudential policies often too timid, too late, or
enacted only after a crisis? Early warning signals, sometimes mixed and
unclear, are in many cases paramount and apparent, if not to the general
public, then at least to policymakers, who are usuallymore attentive to the
broader economic situation and have access to privileged information. In
many circumstances what prevents the implementation of corrective ac-
tions seems to be more lack of political will than lack of information.2
In this paper, we uncover a robust link between political factors and
financial crises, shedding light on the recurring phenomenon of credit
booms gone bust. Ourmain result is that an increase in government pop-
ularity (political booms, henceforth) constitutes a powerful predictor of fi-
nancial crises, above and beyond credit booms. There is an interesting
caveat to this result, however: “political booms gone bust” are an emerg-
ing market phenomenon only.
To measure government popularity we use the “index of government
stability” (stability index, henceforth), a standardized variable provided by
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for over 60 countries since
1984. Additionally, we construct a novel cross-country database on govern-
ment approval by gathering opinion poll data from national sources in
30 countries, which we find to co-move closely with the ICRG measure.
Combining these political time series data with widely used banking cri-
ses data, we show that political booms are good predictors of emerging
market crises and quantitatively as important as other, better known early1 Similarly, Mendoza and Terrones (2012) conclude that “not all credit booms end in
financial crises, but most emerging market crises were associated with credit booms.”
Schularick and Taylor (2012) use a database with 14 developed countries since 1870, while
Mendoza and Terrones (2012) focus on credit booms for a broader set of countries since
1980. See also Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008), Claessens, Kose, and Terrones
(2011), and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012).
2 For evidence on policymakers’ availability of information prior to the Asian crisis, see
Radelet and Sachs (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999), or the International
Monetary Fund (2000). For evidence on the information available to policymakers before
the recent European crisis, see Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013).
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political booms, financial crises 509warning indicators such as credit booms. In our baseline model, a 1 stan-
dard deviation increase in the stability index roughly doubles the proba-
bility of a banking crisis in emerging economies, while it has no predictive
power in developed ones. This result survives a broad range of robustness
checks, such as controlling for asset price booms (stocks, housing), eco-
nomic growth, fiscal spending, central bank independence, or the elec-
toral cycle. Using our new opinion poll data set on government approval,
we also zoom in on the political experiences of 12 major crisis events, pro-
viding further support for our results.
Our finding of political booms gone bust makes any potential explana-
tion of financial crises even more challenging: Why are crises more likely
to occur after a rise in government popularity, and why only in emerging
economies? What makes government popularity a crisis predictor above
and beyond macroeconomic and financial variables? To address these
questions, we introduce a model in which the quest for popularity gains
makes governments less willing to regulate financial markets responsibly,
resulting in a higher risk of crises. Our theory focuses only on political
factors, without relying on exogenous differences in economic funda-
mentals, to provide a self-contained mechanism in which governments’
political motives determine how policy makers deal (or not) with credit
booms and jointly determine the likelihood of financial crises. In a sense,
what drives governments’ popularity and thus the likelihood of crises
is not what governments do (which could be recorded in data and con-
trolled for) but rather what governments avoid doing to stop credit booms.
In the model, there are two types of governments, “good” and “bad.”
Goodgovernments aremore likely to generate good booms, e.g., by introduc-
ing policies that create new investment opportunities and justify credit
expansion (such as trade and labor reforms, innovation incentives, or
more stable institutional environments). These good booms are less likely
to end in crisis as they are sustained by healthy economic fundamentals.
There may be forces in the economy, however, that sometimes induce
the arrival of bad booms, periods of excessive credit expansion fueled only
by bubbles, speculation, and unsound fundamentals.3 To reduce theprob-
ability of an ensuing crisis, governments should regulate the financial sec-
tor during bad booms.
If boom types were publicly observable, agents would identify the gov-
ernment type and the right course of action. But when agents cannot eas-
ily observe economic fundamentals, they must try to infer the boom and
government types fromtheobserveddegreeof regulation(or lack thereof).
And while regulation is the correct policy to respond to bad booms, it is3 For a model of why credit booms that are not sustained by good fundamentals are
more likely to end in crises, see Gorton and Ordoñez (2016). In this paper, we focus in-
stead on governments’ incentives to act upon bad booms or not.
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Allalso politically costly because it makes agents infer that the government
has not been successful in generating a good boom. This results in a “pop-
ularity first, versus country first” trade-off for the government: when po-
tential popularity gains are substantial, governments are more likely to
avoid corrective actions, thereby increasing the risk of a crisis.
Consistent with our empirical findings, the model generates both a
positive correlation between credit booms and political booms and be-
tween political booms and subsequent financial crises. These correlations
are stronger when there is more scope to improve popularity, which hap-
pens when the government quality is relatively uncertain and its popular-
ity is relatively low, two features that are most prominent in emerging mar-
kets, as we show. In short, our model provides one potential explanation
for the empirical facts that we observe: governments in emergingmarkets
have larger political incentives to abstain from regulation and “ride” un-
sound credit booms, resulting in political booms gone bust.
A good example of our mechanism is the Mexican financial crisis of
1994–1995. According to Kessler (1998), Haber (2005), and Calomiris and
Haber (2014), this crisis had its roots in the highly competitive presiden-
tial elections of 1988 in which the long-ruling PRI party won by only a slim
margin. Facing strong political opposition and tight fiscal constraints, the
newly elected President Salinas opted to privatize the country’s banking
sector, spending the proceeds on social programs.4 The sudden liberaliza-
tion was not implemented with sufficient regulation and a lending boom
ensued, with domestic private credit increasing from less than 10% of GDP
in 1988 to nearly 35% of GDP in 1994. During the boom the PRI experi-
enced a strong political comeback, with President Salinas’s approval rat-
ing increasing from about 50% in 1989 to 80% in 1993 (Buendia 1996)
and a subsequent political victory of the PRI and its candidate Zedillo in
the presidential elections of 1994. Just a few weeks later, however, Mexico
entered the largest financial crisis in its history.5 This was a classic political
boom gone bust: a government allowed an unsustainable credit boom to
develop while reaping the political dividend of this boom, at the cost of fi-
nancial fragility. We discuss several other such cases in the paper, includ-
ing the credit and political booms preceding the Asian crisis of 1997–1998
and the Russian crisis of 1998.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that demonstrates
that there is an important political angle to financial crisis dynamics in
emerging economies, both from an empirical and a theoretical stand-
point (see, e.g., Bianchi and Mendoza [2012] and Gorton and Ordoñez4 As Kessler (1998, 46) puts it, “Unable to pursue traditional populist solutions, which
typically called for fiscal stimulus, the government turned to the financial sector.”
5 Calvo and Mendoza (1996) describe how the exchange rate collapsed, nonperforming
loans skyrocketed, capital inflows came to a sudden stop, and the banking system had to be
bailed out and nationalized again, at a cost 4 times the income from the bank sales of 1991.
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political booms, financial crises 511[2014] for related work on the theoretical link between credit and cri-
ses). By establishing that political booms are predictors of financial crises
we complement other explanations such as domestic credit booms (e.g.,
Mendoza and Terrones 2012; Schularick and Taylor 2012), external credit
booms, such as bonanzas of international capital flows (e.g., Calvo, Iz-
quierdo, and Mejía 2008; Forbes and Warnock 2012; Reinhart, Reinhart,
and Trebesch 2017), and productivity growth (Gorton and Ordoñez 2016).
The literature that explores the role of political factors around crises is
scarce. Chang (2007), for example, shows how political crises and finan-
cial crises tend to happen jointly. While also true in our model, our focus
is on the predictive power of political booms preceding crises rather than
on the political crashes that follow. Our results, obtained from a large
panel of countries and crises, are also in line with recent case study evi-
dence: Calomiris and Haber (2014) highlight the political origins of
banking crises, presenting historical evidence of countries facing politi-
cal frictions that resulted in looser banking regulation and more fre-
quent systemic banking crises; Fernandez-Villaverde, Garicano, and San-
tos (2013) study “political credit cycles” in the run-up to the eurozone
crisis; and McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal (2013) show how political dy-
namics in the United States contributed to the buildup of the housing
and credit bubble that led to the 2008 financial crisis.
Our focus is on financial crises, but our model can accommodate the
role of political factors in other areas, such as fiscal policy, monetary pol-
icy, and liberalization regimes, more in line with the political business
cycle (PBC) analysis of Drazen (2000), Chang (2001), Brender and Dra-
zen (2008), Azzimonti (2011) and Ales,Maziero, and Yared (2014).6 Since
potential popularity gainsmay distort behavior and increase the risk of cri-
ses, our paper relates to the literature on political competence, such as
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Persson and Tabellini (2000),
and Maskin and Tirole (2004),7 in which “good politicians” have incen-
tives to distort an optimal policy to signal their quality. In our paper the
welfare-reducing distortion comes, perhaps more realistically, from “bad
politicians” and is more likely in developing economies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start by showing ev-
idence that political booms predict financial crises in emerging econo-
mies, above and beyond credit booms and other economic and political6 Schuknecht (1996) finds a significant effect of elections on fiscal discipline, also argu-
ing that there should be more room for manipulation in developing countries, as checks
and balances are weaker and then incumbents have more power over monetary and fiscal
policy. Shi and Svensson (2006) also find that a fiscal PBC is especially strong in developing
countries, while Tornell and Lane (1999) study distortionary fiscal policy in countries with
weak institutions.
7 The PBC literature goes back to Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976), but the first
paper to incorporate rational voters and office-motivated politicians trying to signal their
competence is Rogoff and Sibert (1988).
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Allvariables. Then we develop a reputation model that proposes a potential
rationalization of these findings based on political motives and suggests
why we observe this phenomenon only in emerging economies. Finally,
we conclude.II. Political Booms Predict Financial CrisesThis section shows that political booms are significant predictors of fi-
nancial crises above andbeyond credit booms, but only in emerging econ-
omies. First, we present a new set of stylized facts on political variables and
crises: the government stability index increases in the run-up to crises in
emerging economies but not in advanced economies. Second, we repli-
cate this pattern more systematically with regressions that control for
credit booms and show a range of robustness tests. Our sample consists
of 22 advanced economies (AEs) and 40 emerging economies (EMEs),
excluding the least developed countries (see the appendix, which is avail-
able as an online supplement) and covering the largest time frame al-
lowed by available information on political variables and financial crises
(1984–2010 for banking crises). Third, we construct a new data set on gov-
ernment approval from opinion polls in 30 countries to (i) show that the
stability index is a good proxy of government popularity and (ii) explore
the evolution of government approval around 12 major crises.A. Political BoomsTo assess the political conditions of a country surrounding financial cri-
ses we use data from the ICRG by the Political Risk Service Group, a lead-
ing supplier of financial, economic and political risk analysis. This data
set was explicitly constructed to provide measures of political risk that
are comparable over time across different political settings, including ad-
vanced and developing countries, democracies, and autocracies. The re-
sulting political risk measures include 12 components that range from
religious and ethnic tensions to corruption, law and order, the role of
the military in politics, or external conflicts.8
In what follows we focus on the ICRG government stability index (sim-
ply stability index, henceforth), which according to the ICRG is an “assess-
ment of both the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s)
and its ability to stay in office” (see PRS Group 2004). This indicator ranges
from aminimum of 0 to a maximum of 12 and is itself composed of three8 The ICRG methodology was developed in the 1980s in conjunction with the US De-
partment of State, and the CIA and builds on research by a large team of country risk ex-
perts. ICRG data are well known and widely used by private corporations and academics
(examples of economic research that exploits this data include Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson [2001], Gelos andWei [2005], and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych [2008]).
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political booms, financial crises 513subcomponents,namely (i) governmentunity(“theextent towhich theexec-
utive/cabinet is coalescedaroundthegovernment’sgeneralpolicygoals”),
(ii) legislative strength (“whether the government can realize its policy pro-
gram through the legislative armof government”), and (iii) popular support
(“the level of support for the government and/or its leader, based on cred-
ible opinion polls”). A key advantage of using this stability index is its wide
and standardized coverage, which goes back to 1984 and includes almost
all emerging markets.
We consider the stability index as an empirical proxy of a government’s
popularity, namely, its political strength and support. In what follows we
refer to an increase of the stability index as a political boom. In section II.E,
we show that the evolution of the stability index captures very well the evo-
lution of government popularity in the countries and time frame in which
public opinion polls are available.9B. Financial CrisesOur main source of financial crises is the widely used data set by Laeven
and Valencia (2010, 2012), which covers systemic banking crises world-
wide and back to the 1980s. Systemic banking crises are defined as events
of major financial distress (significant bank runs, financial losses, and/or
bank liquidations) or major policy interventions (financial bailouts) by
the government. In total, our sample includes 57 banking crises, of which
37 occurred in EMEs.
We start, however, by motivating our stylized facts with a subset of par-
ticularly severe financial crises. Specifically, we select those crises with the
largest output losses according to Laeven and Valencia (2012) and com-
bine this ranking with the selection of major crises by Reinhart and Ro-
goff (2009) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2010). This sample is composed
of 20 “major crises” that are uncontroversial in the magnitude of distress
they caused to the economy, with an average output loss of 67% of GDP
in EMEs and 43% of GDP in AEs.10 Lastly, for robustness purposes, we
use event data on systemic sudden stops during the period 1990–2004,9 The correlation between changes in the ICRG stability index and changes in Institu-
tional Investor’s Country Credit Ratings (used, e.g., in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano
[2003]) is just .06. This is further evidence that the ICRG index captures experts’ beliefs
about the political environment above and beyond experts’ beliefs about the economic
environment.
10 Specifically, the sample of 20 major crises includes the Asian crisis of 1997 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, and Hong Kong) and other well-known
emerging market crises (Russia 1998, Argentina 2000–2001, and Turkey 2000–2001). For
advanced economies, the sample includes four of the “big five” (Norway 1987, Finland
1991, Sweden 1991, Japan 1992, but not Spain 1977 as we do not have political risk data
before the 1980s), as well as the most recent financial crisis in the United States and Eu-
rope (Iceland 2007, Ireland 2007, the United Kingdom 2007, the United States 2007, Greece
2008, Portugal 2008, and Spain 2008).
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Allas compiled by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2008). We provide a list of
crisis events according to all these definitions in the appendix.C. Motivating Facts on Government Stability Prior
to Financial CrisesFigure 1 shows the cumulative percentage change of the government sta-
bility index during the 5 years preceding the start of major financial cri-
ses (focusing on the 20most severe events discussed above).We find stark
differences between the experiences of advanced and emerging econo-
mies. The index increased substantially (on average by 53.7%) during
those 5 years in emerging economies, including the Asian crisis and the
crashes in Russia and Argentina, while the opposite happens (an average
decline of 21.5%) in advanced economies, not only for crises of the late
1980s and early 1990s, but also for the recent crises affecting the United
Kingdom, the United States, and peripheral Europe.
The evolution of the government stability index before major crises
and the clear difference between emerging and advanced economies
are also documented in figure 2, where the vertical gray bar (at t 5 0)
shows the crisis onset. The first panel shows how the stability index in-
creases, on average, roughly from about 6 to nearly 10 in the 5 year in-
terval before severe crises in emerging economies. This increase is statis-
tically significant and corresponds to nearly 2 standard deviations of the
index. The 90% confidence bands (dotted gray lines in the figure) areFIG. 1.—Cumulative change in the ICRG government stability index in the 5 years prior
to 20 major financial crises.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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isodes in emerging economies. The second panel shows the opposite
trend for advanced economies, with the average stability index dropping
by about 2 points in the 5 year interval prior to severe crises. The changeFIG. 2.—Government stability surrounding major crises.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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Allcorresponds roughly to 1 standard deviation and is also statistically sig-
nificant, albeit at a lower confidence level.11
The broader sample of banking crises and sudden stop episodes (see
figs. B.1 and B.2 in the appendix) reinforces these motivating stylized
facts: the stability index increases significantly prior to banking crises and
sudden stops in emerging markets and slightly decreases, but not signif-
icantly, in the run-up to crises in advanced economies.D. Political Booms Predict Financial CrisesWe next assess the relation between popularity and financial crises more
systematically, by studying whether political booms predict financial crises
when controlling for the size of the preceding credit boom and other eco-
nomic and political variables that have been shown to increase crisis risks.1. Empirical Strategy and Main FindingWe follow the literature on early warning systems, in particular the em-
pirical strategy of Schularick and Taylor (2012), who examine the role
of credit booms in predicting banking crises in 14 advanced economies
back to the late nineteenth century.We estimate panel ordinary least squares
(OLS) and probit regressions using a binary variable for the starting year
of banking crises as the dependent variable. The key distinctive feature of
our approach is the addition of political booms to credit booms. Because
of data availability we focus on a shorter time span but broaden the coun-
try sample from 14 to 62 countries, thereby including emerging econo-
mies. The following two regression specifications constitute our bench-
mark: panel OLS (linear probability),
crisisit 5 b1ðLÞDCreditit 1 b2ðLÞDGovStabit 1 b3ðLÞXit 1 vi 1 eit ,
and probit,
probitðcrisisitÞ 5 b1ðLÞDCreditit 1 b2ðLÞDGovStabit 1 b3ðLÞXit 1 vi 1 eit ,
where crisisit is a binary variable for the start of a crisis in country i in year
t, DCreditit is the (year on year) percentage point change in the credit11 We do not show the evolution of the stability index after crises in these figures, since
our main focus is on the precrisis period. Moreover, the before-after comparison is contam-
inated by the fact that governments entering a crisis often lose office shortly after, so that
we would compare the stability of two different governments, one that entered the crisis
and one that assumes power right afterward. In our sample of severe crises, 7 of 9 emerging
countries experienced a change in the executive (i.e., in the ruling party or president)
within 2 years after the crisis. In advanced economies, the turnover count was 7 of 11.
We further explore the evolution of popularity before and after crises in sec. II.E.2 using
poll data on government approval that allow identification of the different governments.
Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2016) provide a long-run analysis on the political after-
math of crises.
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political booms, financial crises 517over GDP ratio,12 DGovStabit is the (year on year) change of the stability
index, L is a lag operator which is greater than or equal to 1,Xit is a vector
of control variables, vi are country fixed effects, and eit is an error term.
Table 1 shows the results using banking crises. Consistent with Schula-
rick and Taylor (2012) the preceding increase in credit (a credit boom)
is a statistically significant predictor of a banking crisis in our broader
sample. With regard to political booms, we find no clear-cut effect in the
full sample (col. 1), as lagged changes in the stability index are not sig-
nificant. The picture changes drastically, however, once we account for
the type of country: in the subsample of emerging economies, the sum
of the lagged coefficients is positive and significant at the 5% confidence
level, while this is not the case for advanced economies (cols. 2 and 3).
Columns 4 and 5 show our preferred baseline specifications for the full
sample with an interaction term for emerging economies. Columns 6 and
7 confirm the results on political booms using yearly lags in credit growth
or a 3 year moving average of changes in the stability index, respectively.
Quantitatively, the coefficients are large. In the OLS regressions, the
sum of the interaction term coefficients of EMEi  ðLÞDGovStabit has a
value of about .04 (cols. 4 and 6). A 1 point increase in the stability index
(year on year) increases the probability of a crisis by nearly 4 percentage
points. This is substantial, given that the probability of a crisis in this sam-
ple is 3.9% overall and that the change of the stability index has a stan-
dard deviation of 1.14. Put differently, a political boom, defined as a 1
standard deviation increase in government stability during 3 years, more
than doubles the predicted probability of a banking crisis in emerging
markets (from 3.9% to 8.2%), after controlling for credit booms.
Importantly, political booms and credit booms seem to reinforce each
other as crisis predictors in EMEs, as shown in column 8 of table 1 with a
specification that interacts changes in credit with changes in the stability
index. Figure 3 illustrates this interaction based on that specific regres-
sion. We plot the estimated coefficient of DCreditit as a function of
DGovStabit and the 90% confidence bands (dotted lines). Credit growth
is statistically significant (lower confidence band above zero) only when
the stability index increases as well.13 This suggests that the crisis risks12 Using alternative measures of credit growth, in particular the percentage change of
the credit/GDP ratio (instead of first differences) or the deviation from trend in real credit
(in percent), affects the predictability of credit booms but not of political booms.
13 For illustration, the change in credit has a coefficient of .0025 when there is no change
in government stability. Thus, with no change in the stability index (zero on the horizontal
axis in fig. 3), an increase in credit growth by 1 standard deviation (4.8 percentage points) is
associatedwith a 1.2 percentagepoint higher crisis probability (namely, :0025  4:8 5 :012).
However, when DGovStabit increases from zero to 1, on average, the coefficient for credit
growth doubles to .005. A 1 standard deviation increase in credit growth then translates into
a 2.4 percentage point higher crisis probability (namely, :005  4:8 5 :024).
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political booms, financial crises 521associated with a credit boom in emergingmarkets are significantly larger
in the presence of a contemporaneous political boom.2. Goodness of FitIn figure 4 we illustrate the power of political booms as a crisis predic-
tor in comparison with credit booms, using a standard diagnostic test for
binary event classification, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve.14
In particular, the black line shows the ROC curve of our main model
(model 1) for both credit booms and political booms based on the regres-
sion of column 5 in table 1. Model 2 (light gray line) uses credit booms
only, and model 3 (dark gray line) uses political booms only.
Intuitively, the ROC curve illustrates how a signal (e.g., credit/political
boom) performs as a crisis predictor. Performance is the ability of the sig-
nal to correctly identify positive cases (crisis) and not identify negative
cases (no crisis), across all possible signal levels (credit and/or popularity
changes). The horizontal axis shows the false positive rate, that is, how
often, if no crisis happens in the sample, the signal predicts a crisis, whileFIG. 3.—Interaction between political booms and credit booms; MA5moving average.14 The ROC curve was first discussed in signal detection theory (Peterson, Birdsall, and
Fox 1954) and then introduced into psychology, and it is now applied in several fields, par-
ticularly medicine. For a classic text on ROC techniques, see Green and Swets (1966).
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Allthe vertical axis shows the true positive rate, that is, how often, if a crisis
occurs in the sample, the signal predicts a crisis. For example, the ROC
curve ofmodel 2 in the figure shows that a credit boom threshold level that
predicts a crisis when there is one, say, around50%of the time (y-axis), also
predicts a crisis when there is not one about 25% of the time (x-axis).15
Thus, a ROC curve closer to the upper left corner and far from the
diagonal indicates a better model fit. This fit is captured numerically by
the area under the curve (AUC), which ranges between .5 and 1. An AUC
value of .5 means that the model performs no better than tossing a coin
(457 line), while a value of 1 indicates perfect prediction, with no false
alarms. The estimated AUC can thus be tested against the null hypothesis
of a .5 value. While both models 2 and 3 (with only credit booms or po-
litical booms, respectively) outperform the coin-toss benchmark signifi-
cantly (the difference between their AUC test is not statistically significant)
and have a similar predictive power, credit booms and political booms are
different and independently informative predictors of crises, as the AUC
statistic for model 1 is a high .76, which is significantly higher than model
2 or model 3 at a 5% significance level.
Equivalently, as an alternative to the ROC curve we can use a contingency
table to illustrate the predictive power across specifications. Table 2 showsFIG. 4.—Receiver operating characteristic curve (probit with country fixed effects).15 Similarly, choosing a very low credit boom threshold level to achieve a near-perfect
true positive rate (e.g., around 95%–98% on the y-axis) comes at the cost of a high number
of false alarms (around 75% on the x-axis).
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political booms, financial crises 523how many of the 49 crises in the sample, and of the 858 no-crisis events,
were correctly classified by each model. The last two rows show the frac-
tion of observed crises that were correctly predicted by the model [for
model 1, e.g., 31=ð31 1 18Þ 5 63:3%] and the forecast success ratio
(FSR), which is the fraction of predicted crises that were really a crisis [for
model 1, 31=ð31 1 228Þ 5 12%]. To put these numbers into perspective,
the coin-toss benchmark is given by the unconditional probability of a cri-
sis, which in our sample is 5.4% (namely, 49=49 1 858).
The results show that models 2 and 3 (which consider only one type of
boom) have a forecast accuracy that is twice as high as tossing a coin, while
model 1, which includes both boom variables, more than doubles it.16 In
particular, both accuracy measures (i.e., the fraction of correctly classified
crises and the FSRs) are similar betweenmodels 2 and 3,whilemodel 1 out-
performs the other models under both measures. These results are quan-
titatively similar to those of earlier work showing contingency tables forTABLE 2











Crisis No Crisis Crisis No Crisis Crisis No Crisis
Predicted:
Crisis 31 228 25 209 22 200
No crisis 18 630 24 649 27 658
Correctly classified crises (%) 63.3 51.0 44.9
Forecast success ratio (%) 12.0 10.7 9.916 These results are based on
sends a crisis signal. We chose
various alternatives, so as to stri
crises when they occur and its
effects and choice of the classi
This content down
All use subject to University of Ca classification thresh
this specific threshold
ke a balance between th
ability to avoid false ala
fication threshold see t
loaded from 035.176.047
hicago Press Terms and Cold of .063 above
on the basis of p
e model’s ability
rms. For more di
he appendix.






ww.jouNote.—This table shows the number of correctly/wrongly classified crisis/noncrisis
years for the full sample (advanced and emerging economies), building on the probit model
from col. 5 of table 1. Analogously to fig. 4, we assess the predictive power of different model
specifications. Model 2 includes only credit booms, meaning lags of the growth of private
credit to GDP; model 3 includes only political booms, meaning lags of the change in gov-
ernment stability. The classification threshold is set to .063 to strike a balance between sen-
sitivity and specificity of the model. Crises are classified as “predicted” if the predicted crisis
probability exceeds this threshold. “Correctly classified crises” denotes the share of correctly
classified crises in total observed crises. The “forecast success ratio” is the fraction of correct
crisis signals in total model signals, computed as (correctly identified crises)/(false alarms1
correctly identified crises). The data on banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia. See
sec. C of the appendix for more details on contingency tables as well as in-sample and out-
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Allbanking crises based on several economic and financial variables. Gold-
stein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), for instance, show a battery of eco-
nomic variables that improve the forecast accuracy of banking crises in a
range between 50% and 100% above the coin-toss benchmark. In a nut-
shell, these results confirm that political variables are as relevant as eco-
nomic variables when forecasting banking crises.
In sum, these tests display two key findings. First, political booms are
as good predictors of crises as credit booms. Second, credit booms and
political booms are different and independently informative predictors
of crises.3. Robustness ChecksWe conduct a large battery of robustness checks. Table A.2 of the appen-
dix contains a summary of all variables used and their details and data
sources.
First, we modify the estimation approach by running (i) random effect
regressions (no country fixed effects), (ii) probit regressions, (iii) regres-
sions that include year fixed effects, which capture potential contagion
effects, (iv) regressions that correct for autocorrelation in the standard
errors, and (v) regressions that exclude the twomain crisis clusters in our
sample (the Asian crisis of 1997 and the financial crisis of 2008). These
changes have little impact on the results. We also control for country-
specific economic variables that may affect the probability of crises, such
as macroeconomic fundamentals and asset prices. In particular, we ac-
count for (i) growth of real GDP, (ii) changes in real house prices, (iii)
changes in real stockprices,17 (iv) the current account balance (as a fraction
of GDP), (v) changes in household consumption (as a fraction of GDP),
(vi) yearly inflation (in percent), and (vii) the change in a country’s terms
of trade.
Second, we control for country-specific political and institutional fac-
tors, in particular, (i) autocratic or quasi-autocratic regime (defined by a
democracy index from the Polity data set), (ii) the political system (pres-
idential vs. parliamentarian), (iii) the quality of institutions (a measure
of executive constraints, also from the Polity data set, and indicators of
bureaucratic quality and the rule of law), (iv) the independence of the
central bank (cross-sectional data from Segalotto, Arnone, and Laurens
[2006]), (v) government turnover (a dummy for “new government,”
which captures whether the government has been in office for 1 or 2 years17 The results with stock and house prices are similar if we use deviation from trend in-
stead of growth rates.
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orientation of the government (a dummy for left-wing governments from
the DPI), (vii) wars and conflicts (both with data from the ICRG and
the Correlates of War project), (viii) the electoral cycle (“years until next
election” and “years in office” from the DPI), and (ix) disruptive politi-
cal events, in particular, “major government crises” and “major cabinet
changes” from Banks and Wilson (2013), federal elections (from the
DPI), and public protests (number of “general strikes” and “violent street
riots,” also from Banks and Wilson). As a catch-all measure we also con-
trol for country credit ratings, using the comprehensive data by Institu-
tional Investor magazine, which goes back to the 1980s for most develop-
ing countries.
Tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix show that none of these additional
controls affect the results qualitatively or quantitatively. As for potential
nonlinear effects,18 adding second- and third-order polynomials of our
credit or political boom variables leaves the results unchanged.
Table B.3 in the appendix shows some of these results for the subsam-
ple of emerging markets. Instead of adding control variables one by one
we include them simultaneously.19 Again the main coefficients on govern-
ment stability remain stable and the control variables themselves are mostly
insignificant and/or show small coefficients.
Finally, we test the relevance of political factors for another type of fi-
nancial crisis, systemic sudden stops, by replacing the dependent variable
with the sudden stop measure compiled by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía
(2008) for 36 countries from 1990 to 2004. Table B.4 in the appendix con-
firms that changes in the stability index are a significant predictor also of
sudden stops, above and beyond credit booms. Quantitatively, both the
effects and the predictive power of political booms are again large.204. Out-of-Sample PerformanceTo further assess the goodness of fit of our models we conduct out-of-
sample tests following the recent literature on financial crisis prediction18 It is possible that an increase in government stability is a by-product of credit booms
that become particularly pronounced at certain levels. If this is the case, our finding on
political booms might merely capture a nonlinear function of credit growth.
19 We thank a referee for suggesting that we also present the results for emerging and
advanced economies separately.
20 In the main model (col. 4 of table B.4 in the appendix), the sum of the three inter-
action term coefficients of EMEi  ðLÞDGovStabit implies that a 1 point increase in the sta-
bility index (less than 1 standard deviation) is associated with a 6.7 percentage point higher
probability of facing a sudden stop. The AUC statistic resulting from the probit model is
a high .79 and statistically different from a coin-toss model. The results are also robust
to the checks performed for banking crises.
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All(e.g., Schularick and Taylor 2012; Catao and Milesi-Ferretti 2014; Ward
2017). The appendix contains a detailed discussion of these results on
out-of-sample forecasting. Specifically, we generate out-of-sample predic-
tions by iteratively fitting our baseline probit models with lags of credit
growth and of the ICRG measure to the available data up to t 2 1 and
use this to predict the crisis probability at year t (i.e., rolling regressions
to forecast 1 year ahead).
The resulting out-of-sample AUC statistic is .62 for banking crises in
EMEs, lower than the in-sample AUC but still significantly better than
tossing a coin and in line with earlier work on predicting banking cri-
ses.21 Most importantly, we find that adding the ICRG measure consider-
ably improves the out-of-sample performance; that is, the stability in-
dex clearly adds power. In a horse race, the ICRG-only model (political
booms) even outperforms the credit-onlymodel (credit booms) in EMEs,
although the difference is not statistically significant. Like before, the
joint model that accounts for both political booms and credit booms
performs best, showing the highest AUC statistic. In advanced economies,
we find that the ICRG measure has no predictive power, while the model
with credit lags (credit booms only) performs well out of sample, with an
AUC of .67. These results are in line with our in-sample findings and give
assurance that political booms are useful for predicting crises 1 year in ad-
vance, but only in emerging economies.
In the appendix we also show out-of-sample results using contingency
tables that are used to predict exact crisis years and also “danger zones”
(namely, including the crisis year as well as 2 years before, as done in pre-
vious work). The model performs well overall, predicting 37% of EME
exact crisis years. This number increases to 63% when we consider “dan-
ger zones.” This result is robust to the choice of the model’s classifica-
tion threshold. Indeed, for any chosen threshold our model produces a
higher FSR than the coin toss, up to more than doubling the forecast
accuracy.E. A New Data Set on Government PopularityWebuilt a novel data set of government popularity by collectingmeasures
of government support directly from reputable polling organizations
worldwide. Our data compilation contains high-quality time series of gov-
ernment approval polls (simply popularity henceforth) in 14 advanced
economies and 16 emerging markets and as far back as possible. To
the best of our knowledge there is no similar sample of polling data on21 In comparison, the out-of-sample AUC is .65 in Schularick and Taylor (2012) and .62
in Ward (2017, logit results).
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The appendix provides a detailed overview of the coverage, data sources,
and definitions.23
These polling data are not sufficiently rich to replicate our previous
stability index regressions, as polling time series are unavailable for many
emergingmarkets during the 1980s and 1990s, the period withmost EME
crises. Specifically, the approval data cover only 7 of a total of 37 emerging
market banking crises, compared to 33 crises that are covered by the
ICRG stability index (see figs. D.1 and D.2 in the appendix for details).24
The new data set serves two purposes: first, to legitimate our interpre-
tation of the stability index as government popularity and its increase as
a political boom, and second, to zoom in on specific crises and track the
evolution of popularity and the political environment surrounding those
events. We develop these two points in the next two subsections.1. Government Stability Captures
Government PopularityThe stability index captures elements of both institutional quality and
popular support, a combination that limits its interpretation as pure pop-
ularity, as we discussed.25 Here we show that changes in popularity are the
most important determinant of changes in the stability index. In other
words, perhaps not surprisingly, institutional quality tends to be a much
more persistent component of the stability index. This helps justify our
definition of political booms as increases in the stability index.
First, we find a high correlation between changes in the stability index
and changes in government approval, as shown in the cross-section scat-
ter plot of figure 5, based on the full sample of 30 countries for which we22 Duch and Stevenson (2008) document that long time series on government approval
or voting intentions are readily available only for a few advanced countries, such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, or Germany, but scarce in most developing countries,
especially prior to the mid-2000s. From 2005 onward, the Gallup World Poll covers govern-
ment approval in more than 100 countries on an annual basis (see Guriev and Treisman
2016). Recently, Carlin et al. (2018) collected executive approval data for 18 Latin Amer-
ican countries.
23 We are very thankful for the support of many people in this process and for their will-
ingness to share data with us (their names are also listed in the appendix).
24 The panel data set with government approval is also highly unbalanced, especially in
EMEs, which is a challenge for any early warning model.
25 A second limitation is that the index is based on risk assessments by country experts,
which could introduce a bias. The code book on the ICRG website states that “the ICRG
staff collects political information and financial and economic data, converting these into
risk points for each risk component on the basis of a consistent pattern of evaluation; the
political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the available infor-
mation” (PRS Group 2004, 2).
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Allhave polling data.26 As an illustration, the appendix also includes the close
co-movement of the twomeasures in four prominent countries in the sam-
ple: the United States, Germany, Argentina, and Russia.
Second, we find evidence that popularity is by far the main ingredient
driving the stability index. Table 3 shows regression results using the sta-
bility index as a dependent variable and government approval (yearly
poll averages) as an explanatory variable, in addition to a set of institu-
tional and political controls (to account for political stability and legisla-
tive factors) and country fixed effects (to account for differences in the
polling methodology across countries). Government approval is statisti-
cally significant both in levels and in first differences. Moreover, 20% of
the large time variation in the stability index can be explained by changes
in government approval alone. In contrast, institutional and political con-
trols (cols. 3 and4) have surprisingly little power in explaining the stability
index and its movements. Put differently, popularity alone, measured di-
rectly throughpolling data, contributesmore to theR 2 value in the regres-
sion than all of the other variables combined (cols. 5 and 6).FIG. 5.—Changes in the stability index (from the ICRG) and popularity (from polls). A
color version of this figure is available online.26 The full sample correlation between the two measures is .41 and statistically signifi-
cant. A similar result holds when using levels, with a correlation of .38. See the scatter plot
shown in fig. E.1 of the appendix.
This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
political booms, financial crises 529Last but not least, we show that the stability index correlates with sub-
sequent electoral outcomes, as one should expect. In particular, table E.1
in the appendix indicates that the lagged stability index is a good predic-
tor for the probability of being reelected and negatively correlated with
executive turnover as well as major government crises.2. The Evolution of Popularity
around Specific Crisis EventsOurnovel polling data set allows us to scrutinize our key results with 12 case
studies, namely, by tracking government approval around well-known cri-
sis events for which poll data are available. These include the emerging
market crises of Mexico1995,HongKong1997, thePhilippines1997,Rus-
sia 1998, and Uruguay 2002, as well as the advanced economy crises of
Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, Ireland 2007, the United King-
dom 2007, Spain 2008, and the United States 2008. As an illustration, we
describe the political context of two of these crises below (the Philippines
1997, an emerging economy, and Sweden 1991, an advanced economy)
and then summarize the evolution of popularity for the other 10 financial
crises in the appendix. The main takeaway is that our key stylized fact is
confirmed: in all cases, government approval increases markedly prior
to crises in emerging markets, but not in advanced economies. Moreover,
the figures illustrate that governments are often replaced after a crisis and
that, around crises, the poll-based government approval series co-move
rather closely with the ICRG stability index.
Figure 6 focuses on the Philippines, where President Ramos enjoyed
increasing public support between the end of 1995 and mid-1997, a pe-
riod with strong economic and credit growth.27 Loans to the private sec-
tor expanded most in 1995 and 1996 (with growth rates of more than
40% per year), and this was partly a consequence of the financial dereg-
ulation enacted after Ramos took office in 1992 (see Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini 1999). In parallel, Ramos’s popularity nearly doubled, as
shown by the polling data, as well as the ICRG stability index. At the peak
of this political and economic boom, and less than a year from the next
presidential elections, President Ramos prominently declared that “the
Philippines is no longer trapped in its old cycle of boom and bust. . . .
That past is now over, and a great era dawns upon us.”28 Yet, the crisis27 Press reports at the time indicate that President Ramos was highly concerned with his
low approval ratings in 1995, taking measures to boost the economy in his final 2 years in
office. His press secretary Hector Villanueva explained that “the president’s policy deci-
sions are, well, not really influenced, but are guided by his popularity performance” (“Ra-
mos Unpopular at Home,” United Press International, February 22, 1996).
28 See his state of the union address of July 1997: https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph
/1997/07/28/fidel-v-ramos-sixth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-28-1997.
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Allbroke out just 2 months later, Ramos’s popularity collapsed, and the op-
position candidate Joseph Estrada won a landslide victory in May 1998.
The political environment looks very different in precrisis Sweden,
where the Carlson government saw a gradual decline in voter support
(from 45% to 30%) in the 4 years preceding the crash of 1991 (the sta-
bility index shows a very similar trend). After the crisis, the ruling Social
Democrats lost the election and a new center-right coalition came to
power (fig. 7).III. ModelWehave shownthatpoliticalboomspredict crises aboveandbeyondcredit
booms, but only in emerging economies. The simple model we present
now illustrates a potential channel connecting political booms with fi-
nancial crises. As we show, the mechanism we propose operates mostly
in emerging economies and is thus consistent with the evidence above.
In the model, governments may try to maintain/improve popularity
by avoiding regulatory actions to control credit booms, thereby increas-
ing the risk of a crisis. Our goal is to explain the emerging market phe-
nomenon of political booms gone bust without imposing ex ante intrin-
sic economic differences between emerging and advanced economies,FIG. 6.—Government popularity surrounding the 1997 crisis in the Philippines.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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political booms, financial crises 533but instead relying on political motivations alone and exploring how
those motivations might differ across countries.
The model predicts that (i) countries characterized by more volatile,
and on average lower, government popularity are more likely to ride
booms; (ii) regulation (or lack thereof) is a key policy feature that distin-
guishes emerging and advanced economies during credit booms. Lastly,
we provide evidence for these two model predictions.A. EnvironmentThe economy is composed of households (or voters) and a government.
A credit boom generates economic gains P for households, but may gen-
erate larger economic losses X > P if it ends in a crisis. The boom can be
good (g) or bad (b). A good boom is sustained by an increase in produc-
tivity and ends in crisis with an exogenous probability h. A bad boom is
sustained by speculation and without regulation may bust, causing a cri-
sis with a higher probability ĥ 5 q 1 hð1 2 qÞ > h, where q is the addi-
tional chance that a bad boom ends in a crisis relative to the good boom.
We assume that regulation reduces the economic gains of a credit boom
only by an ε > 0, while it reduces the probability of crisis from ĥ to h in a
bad boom, not affecting the probability h of crisis in a good boom. WeFIG. 7.—Government popularity surrounding the 1991 crisis in Sweden.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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Allassume that regulation is always optimal in a bad boom [i.e., ðĥ 2 hÞX >
ε] and never optimal in good boom, as ε > 0.29
Given this first-best response for each type of boom, we denote regula-
tion as b̂ (the optimal policy for booms b) and no regulation, namely rid-
ing the boom, as ĝ (the optimal policy for booms g).
There are two types of governments: good (G) and bad (B). The gov-
ernment knows its own type and we assume good governments are more
likely to generate good booms than bad governments; that is,
pG ; Prðg GÞ > pB ; Prðgj jBÞ:
We assume that governments observe the type of the boom, while house-
holds do not, although this strong assumption can be relaxed without
changing our results qualitatively.30 Moreover, good governments always
act optimally (they regulate a boom if and only if it is bad), which allows
us to focus just on the strategy of bad governments.31
Government payoffs increase in two factors: its reputation level f (re-
main in office motivation) and a policy reward parameter r (enact the right
policymotivation). The reputation level f is the household-assessed prob-
ability that the government is good f ; PrðGÞ,32 while the reward pa-
rameter r measures the magnitude of the policy motivation relative to
the office motivation. We assume r > 0, which implies that the govern-
ment’s interests are aligned with those of the voters and that the govern-
ment benefits from enacting policies that are optimal given the nature of
the booms.
This is a single-period economy with the following timing within the
period: Nature draws the government type {B, G }. The government ob-
serves a boom of type s ∈ fb, gg, which depends stochastically on the gov-
ernment’s type. The government decides whether to regulate or ride the
boom r ∈ fb̂, ĝg. Households observe this regulation decision and sub-
sequently a crisis or no crisis cr ∈ fC, NCg, updating their beliefs about
the government’s type. Finally, the government receives a payoff that29 The welfare gain from riding a bad boom is P 2 ĥX and from riding a good boom
P 2 hX . The welfare gain from regulating any boom is P 2 ε 2 hX .
30 What matters for the model to work is that the government has at least some additional
information about the nature of the boom and then the likelihood of a crisis.
31 This assumption is expositionally convenient to maintain a unique outcome. Allowing
good governments to decide whether or not to regulate generically expands the set of equi-
libria. As discussed in Fudenberg and Levine (1998), taking the optimal action is an evo-
lutionarily stable strategy for good governments. We could also justify this assumption by
imposing that good governments face larger costs from crises (or that they have a higher
discount factor), in which case they would optimally choose to regulate bad booms more
frequently than bad governments.
32 In this simple setup we do not model elections and simply interpret the incumbents’
payoff as the reelection chance. This is true in a model in which the incumbent faces an
opponent with the type drawn from an ex ante distribution, and then average reputation.
See the appendix for an application of this reelection chance modeling.
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political booms, financial crises 535depends on its updated reputation fr,cr(f), a function of its current rep-
utation f, its regulation decision (r ∈ fĝ , b̂g), and the crisis state
(cr ∈ fC, NCg). The strategy jBðr jsÞ is defined as B’s chance of imple-
menting policy r in state s; thus B’s expected payoffs in each state are
uðjBð: g ÞÞ 5 jBðĝj jg Þ½r 1 Eðfĝ g Þ 1 jBðb̂
 g Þ½fb̂, (1)
uðjBð: bÞÞ 5 jBðĝj jbÞ½Eðfĝ bÞ 1 jBðb̂
 bÞ½r 1 fb̂, (2)
where Eðfĝ jg Þ is the expected reputation from riding a good boom and
fb̂ is the (expected) reputation from regulating a bad boom.33B. EquilibriumA perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of regulation strategies jB 5
fjBð: jg Þ, jBð: jbÞg and updated reputation fr,cr such that (i) B maximizes
utility, (ii) Bayes’s rule is used to update reputation, and (iii) house-
holds’ beliefs about strategy jB are correct.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, B never regulates a good boom:
jBðĝ jg Þ 5 1.
This result means there is no distortion from the optimal policy dur-
ing good booms. Since jBðĝ jg Þ 5 1, then j ≔ jBðĝ jbÞ is effectively the
only strategic choice variable, that is, the probability of “riding” bad
booms. We call j* ∈ ½0, 1 the amount of distortion in equilibrium, and
we say that the policy is distorted if j* > 0. All proofs can be found in
the appendix.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium exists and is unique. If f ∈ ð0, 1Þ,
the equilibrium displays policy distortion j* > 0 for a positive interval
r ∈ ½0, rÞ.
The intuition of this proposition is illustrated in figure 8, where we
show the net reputational gain from riding a bad boom, Zðj, fÞ 5
Eðfĝ jbÞðjÞ 2 fb̂ðjÞ, and compare it to r. From equation (2) it is clear that
bad governments ride bad booms if and only if Zð0, fÞ ≔ r > r.
Note that Z(j, f) is strictly decreasing in j, with Zð0, fÞ > 0 and
Zð1, fÞ < 0, which means that the net benefits of riding a bad boom
shrink when it becomesmore likely that bad governments ride bad booms:
when bad governments never ride bad booms, then riding is a good sig-
nal for thepublic, equivalent to observing goodbooms, but whenbadgov-
ernments ride bad booms more frequently, riding is no longer a precise33 The expectation is taken over the probability of facing a crisis or not. Since conditional
on regulation there is no further updating conditional on crisis, the expectation term does
not apply in this case. This is just a special result from assuming that upon regulation both
booms have the same probability h of ending up in a crisis.
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Allsignal of a good boom.34 Thus in this case regulation is politically costly:
reputation decreases with regulation.
Inspectingfigure 8, it is evident that an equilibriumexists and is unique.
Intuitively, a larger policy motivation parameter r increases the expected
gains from avoiding crises, which induces more regulation and lower dis-
tortions. It is also clear that, all else equal, as Z(0, f) increases, distortions
j* increase as well.
Figure 9 tracks the critical value r ≔ Zð0, fÞ for different reputation
levels f, showing a nonmonotonicity. The following comparative statics
on the distortion probability j* are evident from the figure but are also
proved in the appendix: (i) No government rides a bad boom if there
are no reputational gains, namely, either if types are the same pB 5 pG
or if there is only one type, f ∈ f0, 1g. (ii) Riding bad booms is more
likely when reputation is intermediate f ∈ ðf, fÞ; that is, when the gov-
ernment’s type is very uncertain there is more room for governmentsFIG. 8.—Properties of Z(j, f).34 Several models of reputation-concerned governments have been proposed in the lit-
erature. Our setting, however, captures our key finding linking popularity surges before
financial crises only in certain countries. Models of reputation in line with the seminar
work of Kreps and Wilson (1982), for example, would suggest that governments “misbe-
have” (i.e., prefer to face the probability of a crisis rather than making efforts to prevent
it) only when their reputation is large. This prediction, however, contradicts our empirical
findings. Here we allow the data to discipline our modeling choices.
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political booms, financial crises 537to change public opinion with their actions. (iii) The larger the pG and
the lower the pB, that is, the larger the variance of political types, the
higher the incentives to ride a bad boom, as the popularity loss from reg-
ulation following the optimal policy is greater.C. Mapping the Model to the DataWe now show that this model is consistent with the findings in the em-
pirical section. First, we demonstrate that the model implies that politi-
cal booms predict financial crises when potential concerns are large.
Then, we discuss why emerging markets are more likely to present larger
popularity concerns, thus making political booms better predictors of fi-
nancial crises in those countries.1. Political Booms Can Predict Financial CrisesIn the model we capture the change of popularity by the interim repu-
tation updating after regulation (or lack thereof ) is observed but before
a crisis (or lack thereof ) is.
The interim updated reputation, conditional on riding a boom (ĝ) and
conditional on regulating a boom (b̂) isFIG. 9.—Governments with intermediate reputation distort more.This content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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Allfĝ ≔
fpG
fpG 1 ð1 2 fÞ pB 1 ð1 2 pBÞj*½  ,
fb̂ ≔
fð1 2 pGÞ
fð1 2 pGÞ 1 ð1 2 fÞ ð1 2 pBÞ 1 2 j*ð Þ½  :
The next proposition shows that interim reputation declines upon
regulation.
Proposition 3. Conditional on observing regulation (riding), repu-
tation declines (increases), namely,
fĝ > f > fb̂:
The ex ante probabilities of observing these interim changes in pop-
ularity are determined by the ex ante probabilities of observing regula-
tion (or lack thereof),
Pr fb̂ð Þ5 f 1 2 pGð Þ 1 1 2 fð Þ 1 2 pBð Þ 1 2 j*ð Þ,
Pr fĝ
 
5 fpG 1 1 2 fð Þ pB 1 1 2 pBð Þj*½  :
Thus, the likelihood of a crisis conditional on observing a decline in
popularity (i.e., conditional on regulation) is
Pr C jfb̂ð Þ 5 Pr C , fb̂ð Þ
Pr fb̂ð Þ 5 h: (3)
Similarly, the likelihood of a crisis conditional on observing an in-




fpGh1 ð12 fÞpBh 1 ð1 2 fÞð12 pBÞj*ĥ
fpG 1 ð1 2 fÞ pB 1 ð1 2 pBÞj*½  5 h 1
j*Q
Pr fĝ
  , (4)
where
Q ≔ 1 2 fð Þ 1 2 pBð Þ q 1 2 hð Þ½ :
Equations (4) and (3) show a larger chance of crisis after observing an
increase in reputation from f to fĝ relative to observing a decrease from
f to fb̂ . In essence, bad governments riding bad booms with positive prob-
ability, j* > 0, is a necessary and sufficient condition for surges in pop-
ularity predicting crises. Importantly, a larger distortion probability j*
implies higher predictive power of a political boom. That is, PrðC jfĝ Þ 2
PrðC jfb̂Þ is larger.
In the appendix we simulate thismodel as a full-fledged repeated game.
We assume an exogenous fraction f0 of good governments in the pool of
politicians. If an incumbent earns a reputation f < f0 she is replaced byThis content downloaded from 035.176.047.006 on February 24, 2020 11:39:28 AM
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political booms, financial crises 539another government with f 5 f0 from the pool, and so forth.35 Then we
run regressions as we did with the empirical data and we obtain the same
qualitative result; namely, in the absence of potential popularity gains,
changes in popularity cannot predict crises.
In the data we cannot directly observe whether governments have or
have not enacted regulations targeted and designed to avoid specific cri-
ses, but we can use the model to interpret an increase in reputation as
reflecting looser financial regulations and a decline in reputation as re-
flecting tighter financial regulations. In spite of the difficulties in captur-
ing the effect of regulations (we do not observe crises that were avoided
by successful regulation), in the appendix we show some evidence that
regulation (or the absence of it) seems to be an important link between
surges in popularity and the likelihood of crises in emerging markets.
First, we show that there is a negative correlation between regulation and
government popularity. Second, we document (i) that emerging market
crises are usually preceded by loose regulation and (ii) that emerging econ-
omies regulate less, relative to trend, during credit booms that end in a fi-
nancial crisis than during credit booms that endwithout crises (the oppo-
site is true for advanced economies).2. Why Only in Emerging Markets?Here we argue that potential popularity gains are stronger in emerging
markets because the reputation of their governments is intermediate
[from the model standpoint this is f ∈ ðf, fÞ and j* > 0]. In contrast,
in advanced economies average popularity is higher (from the model
standpoint a smaller j* such that the difference between eqq. [4] and
[3] is not large enough to predict crises).36
There is a key feature of intermediate reputation levels that allows us
to check whether an environment with high distortions is typical in
emerging economies: volatility of popularity. All else equal, beliefs vary
more when the reputation prior is intermediate. To see this notice that
the Bayesian updating variation is
fĝ 2 fb̂ 5 fð1 2 fÞ pG 2 pB 2 ð1 2 pBÞj
*
Prðĝ ÞPrðb̂Þ ,35 In our single-period setting the initial reputation of a government, f, coincides with
the fraction of good governments in the pool of politicians, f0. In the repeated game, the
fraction of good governments in the pool of politicians only determines the initial reputa-
tion of new governments.
36 In particular, if the reputation is relatively high such as f > f, then j* 5 0, the prob-
ability of a crisis is h, and the increase in popularity does not help to predict a crisis at all.
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Allwhere fð1 2 fÞ is the variance of popularity, which is larger for interme-
diate levels of f.37
Empirically, the popularity of governments in emerging countries is
indeed more volatile: the standard deviation of our stability index is 4.04
in emerging economies and 2.47 for advanced economies, with the dif-
ference being statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. Similarly,
the standard deviation of our new data series on government approval is
21.2% in emerging economies and 13.1% for advanced economies, also
statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
A second piece of evidence suggests that governments in emerging
economies have intermediate reputation levels: (i) reputation cannot be
too low as our database mainly includes democratic countries with regular
turnover and thus reputation is almost always truncated below, and (ii) rep-
utation in advanced economies is higher. The average stability index, for
example, is 8.22 in advanced economies and 7.57 in emerging economies,
with the difference being statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level.38 Finally, to further corroborate this finding the appendix shows that,
even among emergingmarkets alone, political booms predict crises better
in countries with lower levels of popularity.IV. ConclusionsFinancial crises are often credit booms gone wrong, in both developed
and emerging markets. In this paper we show that in emerging econo-
mies, financial crises are also political booms gone wrong. This new fact
helps us to understand why credit boomsmay end up in crises. Ourmodel
proposes an explanation consistent with this finding and other features of
the data: striving to build popularity, governments may avoid corrective
measures during credit booms, which results in higher risk that booms
gobust. In emergingmarkets, governments havemore to gain from riding
credit booms, because the popularity of politicians in these countries is
more volatile compared to advanced economies. This key difference also
explains why most emerging market crises were preceded by inaction or
even deregulation, rather than regulation.
Our paper suggests that financial crises may be the result not only of
exogenous fundamental economic differences across countries, as often
proposed in the literature, but also of perverse incentives within political37 Note that more volatile popularity in our setting is not the result of greater heteroge-
neity in the quality of governments but rather a property of Bayesian updating for interme-
diate priors about the quality of governments. In other words, given a signal, reputation
changes more when the prior is neither too low nor too high.
38 Before 1990 this difference was even larger, with an average popularity index of
8.43 in advanced economies and 6.00 in emerging economies, also a statistically significant
difference.
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political booms, financial crises 541systems. This calls for a dynamic theory of political-financial traps: a coun-
try that holds its politicians in low regard is more subject to crises and
economic volatility, as the political gains from “gambling for redemp-
tion” strategies are larger. This, in turn, makes high-risk policies more
likely and keeps the average reputation of politicians low, a vicious circle.
We have studied how political incentives affect the probability of fi-
nancial crises. The main insight is that credit booms in emerging mar-
kets are particularly dangerous when accompanied by a political boom.
A related question for future work is how politically motivated govern-
ments can “manufacture” credit booms and how political incentives may
influence the evolution of those credit booms in the first place.References
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